VOLUME 18, ISSUE 2

November 2023

West to East: Comparing the Russia-China and United States-India Relationships

By: Imran Aly Rassiwalla

After Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United States, the White House issued a joint statement extolling the newly strengthened strategic alliance between the United States and India. The two nations agreed that Hindustan Aeronautics would jointly produce GE F-414 jet engines, a step towards stronger strategic ties. Many are jubilated at this alliance, viewing it as a great achievement for both nations, while others have expressed hesitation and see it as merely another instance of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” When examining the United States and India’s relationship, a pertinent question can be asked: Are there any other similar relationships on the international stage? Of the several strategic geopolitical alliances on an international scale, one in particular bears striking similarities: Russia and China’s. This article seeks to compare and contrast both the Russia–China and the US-India alliance, and to see what these relationships can tell us about the future of the countries involved. 

First, both relationships inherently stem from shared enemies rather than a historical connection. Russia and China famously hated each other during the 1900s, as both nations claimed to be the “true bastions” of Communism. Now, even though the Soviet Union is dead, the two nations still border each other, leading to inevitable tensions. However, both Russia and China have realized that although they may have conflicting goals, they are both more diametrically opposed to the United States, which is more powerful than either of them. Thus, if Russia has any hope of achieving its aims in Europe (something China cares much less about), and if China has any hope of fulfilling its ambitions in the Pacific (something Russia cares much less about), then they can only succeed through jointly opposing the United states. To counter sanctions against the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russia and China established a yuan-ruble swap line (where both held reserves of the other’s currency) to reduce the hegemony of the United States dollar. When Trump verbally assaulted and sanctioned China during his presidency, Russia and China grew closer, establishing a partnership The Wall Street Journal described as a “relationship of increasing significance.” 

What would ultimately test the limits of this marriage of convenience is the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While China has long refused to condemn Russia’s invasion, it has also refused to support it, repeatedly calling for peace in the region, even recognizing Ukraine’s territorial integrity. One could almost argue that China views Russia as the junior partner in their unorthodox relationship: a child that has gotten too destructive, and one that, though they will not condemn the child for their own sake, needs to be reeled in. Though Russia and China show no sign of ending their relationship, Ukraine’s situation has merely brought to the forefront what the relationship actually is—a halfhearted lifeline. If China ever does pursue its territorial ambitions in Taiwan, at the cost of significant United States and European sanctions, then at least they can rely on Russia to ship them natural gas, just like China has discreetly shipped Russia arms.

Like Russia and China, the United States and India also do not have the most amicable Cold War history. During the second half of the 20th century, the United States largely supported the more capitalist aligned Pakistan against India. However, the rise of China, an enemy that seeks to encroach on both the Indian and Pacific oceans, has led the United States and India to propose their own marriage of convenience. Furthermore, both have distinct spheres, with India caring far more about the Indian Ocean and South Asia, and America focusing on the Pacific and East Asia. 

Of course, some factors are different. While it may be possible to speculate that China views Russia as the junior partner in their relationship, it is rather clear that the United States views India as the weaker partner. Perhaps the best illustration of this is how it took the invasion of another sovereign nation to get China to be neutral on Russian policy, whereas the United States refuses to  support India on something as relatively insignificant as accusations of murdering a Canadian citizen. This would make the halfhearted lifeline that the US-India relationship seems to parallel even more lackluster. Furthermore, the two alliances face vastly different political landscapes. While both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin are dictators who cracked down on corruption and rule with an iron fist, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Joe Biden could not be more different. Modi, and more broadly his BJP party, represent a nationalist populism that only truly makes him comparable to former US President Donald Trump. While Modi is as popular as ever, Republicans under Trump lost the House in 2018, Trump himself lost the presidency and Senate in 2020, and a majority of Trump’s handpicked candidates lost in 2022 (contributing to the weaker red wave). Even if Trump does run again, a one out of four score doesn’t bear well on his political record in a country that is exhausted by one name defining a decade of political conversation.

All of this is to say that, from the lens of a democratic framework, it is likely a good thing that the United States has been able to establish close ties with the largest democracy in the world. It is something that may indeed repress authoritarian ambitions. However, it cannot be overstated as something “revolutionary,” as even recent history proves that the enemy of your enemy is your friend only so long as that friend doesn’t reveal itself to be another enemy.

Information retrieved from The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and Yahoo News.